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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
DIVORCE JURISDICTION - MARRIAGE PERFORMED
WiTHIN STATE HELD SUFFICIENT TO CONFER
JURISDICTION ON NEW YORK COURTS
Husband, served by publication in a divorce action in which
neither party was a resident or domiciliary of New York, moved
to set aside service of process. Held: Motion denied. C. P. A.
§ 1147(2) gives courts jurisdiction in divorce action where parties
were married within the state. David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205
Misc. 836, 129 N. Y. S. 2d. 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
It is generally held that a valid divorce cannot be decreed on
constructive service by the courts of a state in which neither
party is domiciled. Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (1901); Restate-
ment of Conflict of Laws, § 111 (1934). Although in most cases
where the question arises there is no statutory authority similar
to 0. P. A. § 1147(2), it has been said that a statute conferring di-
vorce jurisdiction where neither party is domiciled cannot be com-
plied with. See Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d. 236
(1948); Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181 (Mass. 1833).
In New York, the rule concerning jurisdiction for divorce is
unsettled. The Court of Appeals has stated by way of dicta that
domicil is necessary for jurisdiction. See Gray v. Gray, 143 N. Y.
354, 357, 38 N. E. 301, 302 (1894). This has been followed in the
holdings of lower courts. Barber v. Barber, 89 Misc. 519, 151 N. Y.
Supp. 1064 (Sup. Ct. 1915); England v. England, 129 N. Y. S.
2d 167 (N. Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1954). Mere marriage within New
York, irrespective of the residence of the parties, has been held
insufficient to grant jurisdiction under C. P. A. § 1147 (2). Hune-
ker v. Huneker, 57 N. Y. S. 2d. 99 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
Dicta in other cases recognize divorce jurisdiction where a
marriage is performed within the state. See Becker v. Becker, 58
App. Div. 374, 376, 69 N. Y. Supp. 75, 77 (1st Dep't 1901) ; Oettgen
v. Oettgen, 196 Misc. 937, 941, 94 N. Y. S. 2d. 168, 172 (Sup. Ct.
1949).
In the principal case the court finds that marriage in the state
makes the marital status of the parties a res under the jurisdic-
tion of the court even though neither spouse is domiciled in the
state. This would seem to conflict with Rosenblum v. Rosen blum,
181 Misc. 78, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 626 (Sup. Ct. 1943), which held that
the res is the marital status of a resident of the state.
Even if the plaintiff in this case is successful in the New York
courts, it is doubtful whether a New York decree based solely on
marriage within the state would be entitled to full faith and credit
RECENT DECISIONS
from a sister state. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226
(1945). The reluctance of other states to recognize divorce decrees
where there is no domicil, even when a statute of the forum author-
izes such a decree, is manifested by numerous cases. E. g., Van
Fossen v. State, 37 Ohio St. 317, 41 Am. Rep. 507 (1881).
The court in the principal case relied heavily on Gould v.
Gauld, 235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (1923), in which the Court of
Appeals recognized a divorce decree from a French court even
though the parties were domiciled in New York. The parties
were residents of France, however, -and the French court had per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant. Recognition of the French
divorce was apparently by grace of the New York court and the
case does not stand as a precedent in the area of full faith and
credit. Cf. In re Lindgren's Estate, 293 N. Y. 18, 55 N. E. 2d 849
(1944).
The language of C. P. A. § 1147 (2) certainly indicates a de-
cision such as that in the instant case. However, the questionable
validity in other jurisdictions of a New York decree based solely
on Section 1147 (2) may cause this statute to act as a trap for
the unwary plaintiff.
Alan H. Levine
EVIDENCE - EFFECT OF FEDERAL MI-UNITY
STATUTE ON STATE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant's conviction for a violation of Maryland's gam-
bling law was based on self-incriminating evidence given by him
before a congressional committee, although the federal immunity
statute provided that no testimony given by a witness in con-
gressional inquiries "shall be used as evidence in any criminal pro-
ceeding against him in any court." 18 U. S. C. § 3486 (1952).
Held: The immunity statute precludes the use of such testimony
by the states. Adams v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 179 (1954).
Statutes granting witnesses immunity against prosecution
have been enacted in order to obtain needed testimony without
violating the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by
the 5th Amendment of the Federal Constitution. WIGMVORE,
EVIDENCE, § 2281 (3d ed. 1940). To be granted immunity, the
witness must claim the privilege only if the statute so requires,
United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424 (1943), and must be appear-
ing in response to a subpoena. United States v. May, 175 F. 2d
994 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
